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We propose the continuous-variable quantum key distribution protocol based on the Gaussian modulation
of a single quadrature of the coherent states of light, which is aimed to provide simplified implementation
compared to the symmetrically modulated Gaussian coherent-state protocols. The protocol waives the necessity
in one of quadrature modulations and the corresponding channel transmittance estimation. The security of the
protocol against collective attacks in a generally phase-sensitive Gaussian channels is analyzed and is shown
achievable upon certain conditions. Robustness of the protocol to channel imperfections is compared to that
of the symmetrical coherent-state protocol. The simplified unidimensional protocol is shown possible at a
reasonable quantitative cost in terms of key rate and of tolerable channel excess noise.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last three decades, quantum key distribution
(QKD) [1] has emerged as a way to ensure the security of a se-
cret key through the very nature of quantum states distributed
between trusted parties. Recent developments in this field are
concerned with the continuous-variables (CV) coding of key
bits, [2–19] in particular, the Gaussian modulation of the field
quadratures of squeezed [5–10] and coherent states of light
[11–18]. Coherent state protocols are more promising exper-
imentally [14, 17, 18], and the main goal of the present pa-
per is to propose their further simplification. In particular, all
published coherent-state protocols suppose a symmetrical am-
plitude and phase quadrature modulation [with the exception
of the binary Zhao-Heid-Rigas-Lu¨tkenhaus 2009 (ZHRL09)
protocol [19] However, an asymmetric protocol allows Alice
to use one modulator (e.g. an amplitude modulator) instead
of two. This would reduce the complexity and the cost of Al-
ice’s apparatus. Furthermore, the amplitude modulator used
in a symmetric CV QKD apparatus needs to have a strong
extinction ratio, in order to avoid creating a ”hole” in the cen-
ter of the Gaussian probability distribution [20]. On the other
hand, a simple single-quadrature amplitude modulation does
not have this need, and the use of more standard (and cheaper)
modulators becomes possible.
Thus, in the present paper we propose the unidimen-
sional (UD) CV QKD protocol based on the Gaussian single-
quadrature modulation of coherent states of light. We show
the security of the protocol in a general phase-sensitive chan-
nel restricting eavesdropper only by the physicality con-
straints and keeping to the pessimistic worst-case assump-
tions. Then we compare the UD protocol to the standard
coherent-state protocol and discuss the possible extensions.
Our paper thus continues the tendency of technical simplifi-
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cation of the QKD protocols which was started in [21], where
the low cost and compact discrete variable QKD system was
proposed.
In Sec. II, we present the UD CV QKD protocol, and we
analyze its security in Sec. III. We then look at its perfor-
mance in the common case of symmetric quantum channels
and compare it to the usual symmetric protocol in Sec. IV.
II. UNIDIMENSIONAL PROTOCOL
The central idea of the protocol is to modulate a single
quadrature of coherent states, in contrast to the usual coherent-
state protocols, where two quadratures are simultaneously
modulated. This should provide simplified implementation,
at the price of slightly degraded performances, as we show
below. The scheme of the protocol is given in Fig. 1. One
of the trusted sides, Alice, produces coherent states, e.g. with
a laser source. Then she applies modulation in one of the
quadratures (denoted as x), using modulator M, and displaces
each coherent state according to a random Gaussian variable
with displacement variance VM . With no loss of generality
we further assume the modulated quadrature x to be the am-
plitude quadrature. In this case the displacement can be per-
formed by an intensity modulator. The mixture of the modu-
lated states thus forms a “sausage” on a phase-space [see Fig.
1 (a)]. Its thickness is the quadrature variance of a coherent
state, i.e. 1 shot noise unit (SNU), and its length is √VM + 1
SNU. The states are then sent to the remote trusted party
Bob through a generally phase-sensitive channel with trans-
mittance ηx, ηp, and excess noise ǫx, ǫp in x, and p quadrature,
respectively. Bob performs a homodyne measurement of the
modulated quadrature, using a homodyne detector, measuring
most of the time the xquadrature, and sometimes measuring
the pquadrature. This basis switching should be performed of-
ten enough to gather statistics on the properties of the channel
in the p-quadrature. However, in the asymptotic limit of many
repetitions studied here, these measurements can be a vanish-
ing fraction of the total data set and have a negligible impact
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FIG. 1: (Color online) Scheme of the UD coherent-state protocol.
Alice prepares a coherent state using a laser source and then mod-
ulates the state by displacing it along the modulated quadrature us-
ing modulator M so that the modulation variance is VM . The states
travel through an untrusted generally phase-sensitive channel to a re-
mote party Bob, who performs homodyne measurement of the mod-
ulated quadrature. (a) Mixture of modulated coherent states on a
phase space (assuming x quadrature was modulated). (b) Equiva-
lent entanglement-based scheme using a two-mode squeezed vacuum
source, mode A is measured by Alice using a homodyne detector,
mode B is squeezed on the squeezer S and sent to the channel.
on the key rate [22]. After a sufficient number of runs, Al-
ice and Bob analyze the security and extract a secret key from
the x-quadrature data using a reverse-reconciliation procedure
[12, 14].
In the following section we estimate the security region of
the UD protocol and compare it to the standard coherent-state
based protocol.
III. SECURITY OF THE PROTOCOL
Let us study the protocol in detail and estimate its applica-
bility.
A. Computing the Key Rate from the Covariance Matrix
The study of security of CV QKD protocols including fi-
nite size effects [23, 24] and coherent attacks is an ongoing
research program[7, 8, 25–27]. Very recently [28], Leverrier
has shown for the first time the composable security against
general attacks for a CV QKD coherent-state protocol. It was
shown that for the symmetrically modulated coherent-state
protocol, the optimal attacks are the Gaussian attacks and the
corresponding secret key rate tends to the one obtained for
Gaussian collective attacks [29–31] for high number of pulses.
We will compute the asymptotic key rate of our protocol
against collective attacks. An approach similar to [28] can
likely be applied to extend this security to a general attack,
but this work is kept for future research.
The extremality of Gaussian states [32] and subsequent
optimality of Gaussian attacks [29, 30] allows one to use
the powerful covariance matrix formalism to estimate the
amounts of information leaking to a potential eavesdropper
under given channel conditions.
In the case of collective attacks the lower bound on the key
rate is given by the difference between classical (Shannon)
mutual information, available to the trusted parties (A and B),
and the upper bound on the information extractable from the
state possessed by an eavesdropper (E) and conditioned by the
measurement results of the reference side of the classical post
processing algorithms, i.e., in the case of reverse reconcilia-
tion the lower bound reads:
K = IAB − χBE , (1)
where χBE = S(E) − S(E|xB) is the Holevo quantity [33],
being the capacity of a bosonic channel between an eaves-
dropper (E) and the reference side of the information rec-
onciliation (B), quantified as the difference of von Neumann
entropy S(E) of the state, available to an eavesdropper, and
the entropy S(E|xB) of the eavesdropper state, conditioned
by the measurement results of the remote trusted party B
[29, 30]. The positivity of the lower bound (1) means that
the post-processing algorithms are able to distill the secure
key [34, 35], i.e., that the protocol is secure under given chan-
nel conditions. In the cases where channel noise is present,
the collective attack can be accessed through the assump-
tion that the eavesdropper holds the purification of the state,
shared between A and B, thus the entropies of the sub states
of the generally pure state are equal: S(E) = S(AB) and
S(E|xB) = S(A|xB). The calculation of the von Neumann
entropies, contributing to the Holevo quantity, is done, us-
ing the covariance matrix formalism, explicitly describing the
Gaussian states, through the symplectic eigenvalues λ1,2 and
λcond of the respective covariance matrices γAB prior to and
γA|xB after the measurement so that
χBE = G
(
λ1 − 1
2
)
+G
(
λ2 − 1
2
)
−G
(
λcond − 1
2
)
,
(2)
whereG(x) = (x+1) log(x+1)−x log x [36] is the bosonic
entropic function [37].
B. Which Covariance Matrices are Physical ?
To analyze the security of the protocol we switch to the
equivalent entanglement-based (EPR) scheme [38], which al-
lows the explicit description of trusted modes and their cor-
relations. For the UD protocol such a scheme can be built,
by taking a two-mode squeezed vacuum state of variance V
and squeezing one of its modes with the squeezing parameter
− log√V , resulting in the covariance matrix:
γAB =


V 0
√
V (V 2 − 1) 0
0 V 0 −
√
V 2−1
V√
V (V 2 − 1) 0 V 2 0
0 −
√
V 2−1
V
0 1


(3)
As stated above, the modulated quadrature is the intensity
quadrature x. If Alice performs a homodyne measurement
3on the mode A, then the coherent state is conditionally pre-
pared and is effectively sent to the remote party Bob. The
EPR-scheme is then equivalent to the Gaussian displacement
of coherent states along the x quadrature with the variance
VM = V
2 − 1. As the states travel through the noisy and
lossy channel, the covariance matrix is transformed according
to the channel parameters. However, since there is no modula-
tion in the p quadrature, the correlation, and, respectively, the
channel transmittance in p cannot be estimated. The remote
party can therefore only measure the variance of the channel
output in p. Thus, generally, the covariance matrix after the
channel in terms of the modulation variance VM has the form:
γ′AB =

√
1 + VM 0
√
ηxVM (1 + VM )
1
4 0
0
√
1 + VM 0 Cp√
ηVM (1 + VM )
1
4 0 1 + ηx(VM + ǫx) 0
0 Cp 0 V
B
p


(4)
where ηx and ǫx are, respectively, the channel transmittance
and excess noise, estimated by the trusted parties through the
measurement of the x quadrature; V Bp is the output variance
of the mode B in the p quadrature, which is measured at the
remote side, and Cp is the correlation between trusted modes
in the p quadrature, being unknown due to the fact that the
quadrature is not modulated, which means that the channel
transmittance is not estimated in p.
The covariance matrix of the state, conditioned by Bob’s
measurement in x is given by
γA|xB = γA − σAB(XγBX)MPσTAB, (5)
where γA, γB are the submatrices of the covariance matrix
γ′AB (4), describing the modes A and B individually; σAB is
the submatrix of (4), which characterizes correlation between
modes A and B; MP stands for Moore Penrose (pseudo-) in-
verse of a matrix, and
X =
(
1 0
0 0
)
. (6)
In the general case the conditional matrix is thus given by
γA|xB =
[√
VM+1(1+ηxǫx)
1+ηx(VM+ǫx)
0
0
√
1 + VM
]
, (7)
Now let us estimate the lower bound on the key rate (1) for
our single quadrature protocol. Shannon mutual information
between the trusted parties is easily calculated from the first
diagonal elements of the matrices γA and γA|xB :
IAB =
1
2
log
VA
VA|B
=
1
2
log
(
1 +
ηxVM
1 + ηxǫx
)
(8)
On the other hand, the estimation of the Holevo quantity
χBE , representing the upper bound on information, avail-
able to an eavesdropper, should be done from the whole state
and, thus, depends on the unknown correlation parameter Cp.
However, this unknown parameter is bounded by the require-
ment of the physicality of the state, which is given by the
Heisenberg uncertainty principle, in terms of the covariance
matrices being [37]
γ′AB + iΩ ≥ 0, (9)
where Ω is the symplectic form
Ω =
n⊕
i=1
ω , ω =
(
0 1
−1 0
)
. (10)
This equation imposes physical constraints on the possible
values of Cp. Such constraint in the general case of noise
present in both quadratures is given by the parabolic equation
on the {V Bp , Cp} plane:
(Cp − C0)2 ≤ VM
(1 + VM )
1
2
(1− ηxV B0 )(V Bp − V B0 ) (11)
with vertex (V B0 , C0), defined as:
V B0 =
1
1 + ηxǫx
(12)
and
C0 = −V
B
0
√
ηxVM
(1 + VM )
1
4
. (13)
The first part of the Holevo quantity, S(AB), can be calcu-
lated from the symplectic eigenvalues λ1,2 that are given by
the square roots of the solutions of equation
z2 −∆z + det γ′AB = 0, (14)
where ∆ = det γA + det γB + 2detσAB is the second sym-
plectic invariant, the first one being det γ′AB . The second part,
S(A|xB), is calculated from λcond =
√
det γA|xB . This al-
lows one to analytically derive the lower bound on the key
rate and find the security bounds in terms of the unknown cor-
relation Cp upon given (measured) V Bp .
The corresponding physicality region and security within
physicality in terms of the correlation Cp are given in Fig. 2.
It is evident from the graph, that there exists a region of
V Bp , when the protocol is secure for any Cp. In this region the
UD protocol can be indeed implemented without the necessity
of the correlation estimation in p, since no physically valid
collective attack can break the security. For higher values of
V Bp the protocol cannot be implemented, since it would only
be secure for some values of Cp, but Alice and Bob cannot
estimate the latter quantity. Such a behavior can be clearly
observed at the graphs in Fig. 3, where dependence of the
lower bound on the key rate on the correlation Cp is given for
different values of V Bp , corresponding to the respective lines
in Fig. 2.
When the channel excess noise ǫx > 0 increases, the phys-
icality region of the state after the channel expands, which
allows Eve to perform stronger attacks.
4FIG. 2: Physicality (solid line) and security within the physicality
(dashed line) regions of the UD protocol. The pessimistic value of
Cp, which minimizes the key rate, is given as a bold solid line. Mod-
ulation variance VM = 10, channel transmittance in x, ηx = 0.1,
noise in x, ǫx = 5% SNR. Point A = (C0, V B0 ) denotes the vertex
of the parabola, described by (11). The lines 1, 2, and 3 correspond
to the key rate dependencies given in Fig. 3.
FIG. 3: Key rate secure against collective attacks versus correlation
Cp for different values of variance V Bp , corresponding to the lines
1, 2, and 3 in Fig. 2. The rest of the channel parameters are the
same as in the mentioned figure. Inset demonstrates the dependence
of line 2 in the smaller scale. For comparison the line corresponding
to V Bp = 1.00535 is given as dashed, demonstrating the particular
case when security is lost and then restored.
C. Worst-Case Cp and Key Rate
Counter-intuitively, the key rate is not always a
monotonously decreasing function of the correlation
|Cp|. Indeed, it can be seen from Fig. 3 that upon certain
values of variance V Bp the lower bound on the key rate can
have a local minimum within the security region. Moreover,
the security can be even lost and restored (see the dashed line
at the inset in Fig. 3).
However, when the channel excess noise added in p-
quadrature is small (i.e., when V Bp is close to 1), the key rate is
a monotonously decreasing function of the correlation |Cp| (as
can be also seen in Fig. 3) in most of the physicality region,
and the pessimistic value for Cp is typically the highest phys-
ically valid negative value Cmaxp , which saturates inequality
(11).
As the noise increases, the pessimistic value of Cp gets
lower than Cmaxp and must be found numerically. We thus
consider the security region of our protocol as laying along
the pessimistic value of Cp (given as a bold line in Fig. 2)
from C0 to V B,maxp , where physicality and security regions
cross. In this case, a key rate computed at Cmaxp is greater
than the lower bound on the real key rate and is therefore too
optimistic. However, when the pessimistic value of Cp is in-
side the parabola, the ∂K/∂Cp = 0 at this point and the pes-
simistic value is usually close toCmaxp . This explains why this
upper bound, computed below, is often a good approximation.
The parabola bounding the physicality region corresponds
to a state saturating the Heisenberg inequality (9). There-
fore, one of the symplectic eigenvalues λ2 = 1 and λ1 =√
det γ′AB and Eq. (2) becomes
χBE
(
1
2
√
det γ′AB − 12
)
−G
(
1
2
√
det γA|xB − 12
)
(15)
when Cp = Cmaxp .
When VM ≫ 1, i.e., in the strong-modulation limit,
det γ′AB ≫ 1 and one can use the expansion of the bosonic
function G
(
1
2 (λ− 1)
)
= logλ + log e2 − log e6λ2 + O
(
1
λ4
)
, to
derive the following expression for the key rate upper bound:
KVM→∞ .
1
2 log
ηx
1−2ηx+ηxV Bp +ηxǫx+2
√
D
− log e2
+G
(
1
2 (
√
1
ηx
+ ǫx − 1)
)
+O( 1√
ηxVM
)
(16)
with D = ηx(1 + ηxǫx − ηx)(V Bp (1 + ηxǫx)− 1), (17)
where . can be replaced by≃ when Cmaxp is indeed the worst
Cp. If, furthermore, we are in the strong loss limit, where
ηx ≪ 1 [39] and V Bp is close to 1, one can expand the remain-
ing bosonic function and obtain
KVM→∞
ηx≪1
.
[(
1
3 +
1−V Bp
2
)
ηx −
√
D
]
log e+O(η2+ 1√
ηxVM
)
(18)
In the following Section we analyze the security of the UD
protocol in the typical phase-insensitive Gaussian channels.
IV. PERFORMANCE FOR SYMMETRIC QUANTUM
CHANNELS
In typical communication channels, one expects values of
loss and excess noise in both quadratures to be symmetric.
In this regime, ηx = ηp ≡ η, ǫx = ǫp ≡ ǫ, and therefore,
V Bp = 1 + ηǫ. The previous equations then become
KsymVM→∞ .
1
2 log
η
1−η+ηǫ+η2ǫ+2√D − log
e
2
+G
(
1
2 (
√
1
η
+ ǫ− 1)
)
+O( 1√
ηxVM
)
(19)
with D = 2η2ǫ(1 + ηǫ − η)(1 + 12ηǫ). (20)
KsymVM→∞
η≪1
. (13 −
√
2ǫ)η log e +O(η2 + 1√
ηxVM
) (21)
5Note that Eqs. (19)-(21) describe well the lower bound on
the key rate if the losses or noise in the channel are low, i.e.,
η → 1 or ǫ → 0, otherwise they give the result exceeding the
lower bound on the key rate, and the latter needs to be calcu-
lated numerically using the pessimistic Cp within the physi-
cality region.
We now compare the UD CV QKD protocol with the stan-
dard symmetrical modulation protocol GG02 [11, 12, 29, 30]
used over the same channel. We first assume a noiseless lossy
channel, where ǫ = 0.
In this case, Eq. (11) becomes Cp = C0 and Eq. (18)
gives therefore the key rate for our protocol. It becomes, for
VM →∞
KsymVM→∞
ǫ=0
=
1
2
√
η
log
1 +
√
η
1−√η − log e+O(
1√
ηxVM
) (22)
Its low transmission limit rate is η3 log e, slightly smaller than
the key rate of the standard coherent-state protocol in the high
modulation limit, given by [40]
KGG02VM→∞ = − 12 log (1 − η) ≃
η
2
log e for η ≪ 1. (23)
In the general case, however, the channel noise is present
and reduces the security of the protocol. The results of the cal-
culations in this case are given in Fig. 4 in terms of the lower
bound on the key rate upon fixed channel excess noise and
in Fig. 5 in terms of the maximum tolerable channel excess
noise versus channel loss upon strong modulation VM = 100.
Evidently, the UD protocol demonstrates higher sensitivity to
channel excess noise, which is the cost of technical simpli-
fication, but still provides the reasonable security region in
terms of channel excess noise, even in the pessimistic assump-
tion of the strongest physically possible collective attack. We
also provide comparison with the case when the worst-case
Cp is not estimated numerically but is optimistically taken as
a bound to physicality Cmaxp (so that the key rate is approx-
imately given by (21) in the limit of strong modulation), the
respective curve is given as the dot-dashed line in Fig. 5. It
is evident from the plot that the optimistic assumption of the
physicality-boundedCmaxp gives the same security bounds as
the pessimistic one when the channel attenuation goes below
few dB. In this regime it is sufficient to bound security by the
physicality condition.
Zhao et al. have also introduced a single-modulation proto-
col, ZHRL09. Contrary to our independently developed pro-
tocol, it uses a binary modulation, simplifying even more the
protocol implementation. However, its sensitivity to excess
noise is orders of magnitude below the tolerable excess noise
of the protocol presented here: An excess noise as small as
ǫ = 3 × 10−3 does not allow any positive key rate beyond
1 dB losses, and ǫ ≃ 10−3 does not allow one to go beyond
4 dB losses. This extreme sensitivity renders ZHRL09 use-
less in practice. In their conclusion, Zhao et al. attribute this
sensitivity to the binary modulation and predict that a Gaus-
sian modulation would solve this problem. The present paper
indeed proves this conjecture.
For the sake of comparison we also analyzed the protocol,
in which no information is extracted from the p quadrature,
FIG. 4: Typical dependence of the key rate on loss (in dB scale) upon
symmetric channel excess noise ǫ = 5% SNU. (Solid line) Symmet-
rical coherent-state protocol; (dashed line) UD protocol with corre-
lation estimation in p; (dotted line) UD protocol without correlation
estimation in p. Modulation variance VM = 100.
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FIG. 5: Typical profile of the security region in terms of maximal
tolerable channel excess noise ǫ versus channel loss (in dB scale).
(Solid line) Symmetrical coherent-state protocol; (dashed line) UD
protocol with channel estimation in p; dotted line: UD protocol
without channel estimation in p; (dot-dashed line) optimistic eval-
uation of UD protocol without channel estimation in p assuming
Cp = C
max
p . Modulation variance VM = 100.
but some modulation and measurement is performed to esti-
mate the channel transmittance (and, equivalently, the correla-
tion) in p. This intermediate protocol provides the security re-
gion, which lays in between the symmetrical and completely
asymmetrical counterparts, but requires modulation in both
quadratures. Its main interest it theoretical, since it allows one
to split the origin of the performance degradation of our pro-
tocol compared to GG02 between the degradation due to the
asymmetric modulation and the one due to incomplete chan-
nel estimation.
Another possible option to improve the UD protocol could
be the noise addition in p to decouple the eavesdropper from
the remote trusted party. However, it widens the physicality
region, allowing for the stronger collective attacks, and thus,
if the noise is strong enough, security is always broken be-
fore the physicality bound, meaning that additional noise in
p makes the protocol inapplicable. Additionally, if the chan-
nel estimation in p is performed, then the protocol shows the
same performance as the standard squeezed-based protocol
[6, 12, 29, 30], since the homodyne detection on A projects
6the two-mode state on the single-mode squeezed state, getting
more squeezed as the noise in p increases.
Further analysis of the protocol will include consideration
of reduced post-processing efficiency [41], composable se-
curity [28], and finite-size effects [23, 24], which, however,
depend on the signal-to-noise ratio and number of samples,
rather than the Gaussian modulation profile and thus would
affect the symmetrical and asymmetrical protocols similarly.
The position of the pessimistic bound for the unmeasured
correlation in p in particular does not depend on the post-
processing efficiency.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed and investigated the unidimensional
continuous-variable quantum key distribution protocol based
on the Gaussian modulation of a single quadrature of coher-
ent states of light, in which physicality bounds enable to limit
the eavesdropping attacks and assess the security region. The
protocol allows simpler technical realization with no need of
phase quadrature modulation and full channel estimation at
the cost of lower key rate and higher sensitivity to channel ex-
cess noise, compared to the symmetrical coherent-state proto-
col. However, the performance of the protocol is still compa-
rable to that of the symmetrical counterpart and allows for the
practical implementation.
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